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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1997, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
tightened its standards for air quality control based on the
findings of Harvard's School of Public Health's Six Cities
Study.' Consequently, new air quality standards imposed
large financial burdens on certain industries.2 Scientists
and other interested parties from General Motors (GM), the
Chemical Industry Institute of Technology (CIIT), the Air
Quality Standards Coalition (AQSC),3  and Congress,
requested that the EPA release the Harvard data for
J.D., 2001, Albany Law School; Member, Albany Law Review;
Sandman Fellow, 2000. M.L.S., B.A., University at Buffalo. Former Data
Archivist, Center for Social and Demographic Analysis, University at
Albany, SUNY. Contact the author at: eadelman@att.net. The author
would like to acknowledge Evelyn Tenenbaum, Rose Mary Bailly, and Scott
Boesel for their time, support, and encouragement while writing this article.
In addition, special thanks to Melody Munger, Robert Adelman, and
Richard McMillan for their assistance.
1. George D. Thurston, Mandating the Release of Health Research Data:
Issues and Implications, 11 TUL. ENVrL. L.J. 331, 335 (1998). The Harvard
Six Cities Study was a longitudinal epidemiologic study that began in 1974.
The study examined the effects of ambient sulfur oxides and particulate
matter on the respiratory systems of children and adults. The study
participants were selected from the following six cities: Watertown, MA;
Harriman, TN; Steubenville, OH; St. Louis, MO; Portage, WI: and Topeka,
KS. Frank E. Speizer, Asthma and Persistent Wheeze in the Harvard Six
Cities Study; Environmental and Occupational Asthma, 98 CHEST 191S5
(1990).
2. Thurston, supra note 1, at 335.
3. See id. at 337. The AQSC is comprised of more than 500 corpora-
tions and interest groups, including oil, steel, trucking, and auto
companies.
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retesting and validation.4 The EPA rejected the requests
because the National Institute of Health, the Office of
Scientific Integrity, and the Health Effects Institute (HEI)
already reviewed the original investigators' actions and
data for scientific integrity.5 Their evaluations confirmed
the validity of the data and methodology.' However, under
pressure, the EPA eventually recommended that the
Harvard researchers release the data to the interested
government and scientific parties.7  The Harvard
researchers responded by allowing the HEI, an unbiased
research group, to review the data.8
The EPA denied subsequent requests by other parties to
review the data.9 In response to the denials, Senator
Richard Shelby1" included a one-sentence amendment to a
four thousand-page appropriations bill that was passed
into law. 11  That one sentence materialized as an
amendment to the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) Circular A-110.12 The final amendment to this
Circular effectively superseded the Supreme Court's
holding in Forsham v. Han-is13 making all data produced by
a study funded, or partially funded, with federal grant
money subject to disclosure under the Freedom of
4. See id. at 336.
5. Id. at 337-38. The investigations were initiated due to allegations of
misconduct and inappropriate analyses.
6. Id. at 338.
7. Id.
8. See id. at 338-39. The Health Effects Institute, established in 1980,
is an independent, non-profit corporation that aims to provide impartial
findings on the health effects of pollutants. The Health Effects Institute
Homepage, at http://www.healtheffects.org (last modified Jan. 24, 2001).
9. Thurston, supra note 1, at 338.
10. Richard C. Shelby is a Republican Senator from Alabama. LEADER-
SHIP DIRECTORIES, INC., 25 CONGRESSIONAL YELLOW BOOK 188 (1999).
11. Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropria-
tions Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681, 2681-495 (1998).
12. See infra notes 29-35 and accompanying text (describing the role of
the OMB and the role of OMB Circulars in federal grant awards).
13. 445 U.S. 169, 176-78 (1980) (holding that raw data gathered by
independent researchers under a federal grant award were not agency
records subject to disclosure under the FOIA despite the fact that the data
were relied upon by a federal agency in taking certain actions and holding
that independent researchers awarded federal grant money were not
agencies for the purpose of the FOIA).
Information Act (FOIA).14
The final amendment to OMB Circular A-110 leaves
researchers vulnerable. Since the majority of FOIA
requests are commercial in nature and in scope, 
1 5
commercial requesters may take advantage of a loophole
left open by the amendment to this Circular. 16  Grant
recipients will be forced into a role traditionally reserved for
federal agencies.17 Moreover, the discretionary grant, itself,
becomes unattractive as it will be fraught with difficulties
for researchers."8
This Comment will explore the tension between the FOIA
and the ideal of open government, and the countervailing
societal interests of intellectual freedom, scientific inquiry,
and the political process. 9 This conflict can be seen in the
context of a data access debate that has resonated since
Forsham was decided in 1980.20 Part II will provide
introductory information, define grants and grant
conditions, provide an overview of the FOIA, and discuss
Forsham and the relevant OMB Circular2 revisions. Part
III will discuss the implications of the revisions, and Part IV
will conclude with a recommendation for the OMB to revise
the final amendment to OMB Circular A-i 10 based on
several potential remedies that can speak to the concerns
of those on both sides of the data wars debate.29
14. Philip J. Hilts, A Law Opening Research Data Sets Off Debate, N.Y.
TIMES, July 31, 1999, at Al; see infra notes 36-57 and accompanying text
(providing a definition and summary of FOIA).
15. JAGER, infra note 105 and accompanying text (showing that the
majority of FOIA requests are from businesses).
16. See infra Part III.A (articulating the scope of the loophole).
17. See infra Part III.B (discussing how grantees are expected to behave
like government agencies).
18. See infra Part III.C (probing the possibility that the discretionary
grant will become extinct).
19. This comment will not explore the important topic of privacy issues
at risk as a result of the amendment to OMB Circular A- 110. For example,
one privacy concern associated with the amendment to OMB Circular A- 110
is protecting the confidentiality of study participants.
20. Forsham, 445 U.S. at 169.
21. See infra Part II.A.2 and accompanying text (explaining the purpose
of OMB Circulars).
22. See infra Part IV (concluding by suggesting compromises that may
appeal to both grant recipients and FOIA requesters).
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II. BACKGROUND
A. Discretionary Grants23
A grant is loosely defined as "financial assistance
authorized by federal law to support autonomous
programs... which the federal government does not
dictate but does wish to encourage."24 The types of grants
affected by the amendment to OMB Circular A-110 are
discretionary grants. Researchers apply for money, usually
in the form of a discretionary grant, to fund their research
projects. A discretionary grant is a type of federal grant
that is given at the will of the federal awarding agency. 2 A
principal investigator applies for a grant, and a federal
granting agency has the discretion to choose grantee(s)
from a pool of applicants.26 In addition, the granting
agency sets the amount of the grant and the conditions of
the funding.27
1. Grant Conditions
The conditions imposed on grantees are often multi-
layered. There are government-wide conditions, agency-
wide conditions, as well as special conditions. 8  Of
particular importance in this Comment, is the mandatory
deference to OMB Circulars imposed by agencies and its
impact on grantees.
23. Discretionary grants are also known as project grants. PAUL G.
DEMBLING & MALCOLM S. MASON, ESSENTIALS OF GRANT LAw PRACTICE § 2.04(b)
(1991).
24. Id. § 2.02.
25. Id. § 2.04(b) (explaining that the federal awarding agency can either
refuse to award the grant to an applicant or it can award the grant with or
without conditions imposed on the grantee).
26. Id.
27. Id.; see also id. § 9.02(a) (explaining that discretionary grants are
direct grants in the sense that the federal funds awarded are given directly
to the grantee).
28. Id. §§ 11.01-.02.
2. OMB29 Circulars
OMB Circulars were created pursuant to statute and
include recommendations to the agency" as grantor.
Circulars set out uniform rules for agencies to follow as a
way of standardizing agency and grantee procedures with
respect to grant awards." These uniform rules are not
binding on the grantee unless incorporated by reference
into a grant, or formally adopted by the agency as a
condition of all grant awards. 2  Grant conditions are
included in the grantor's award letter.3 When a grantee
accepts the grant money, the grantee then has an
obligation to comply with the conditions set forth explicitly
or implicitly by the awarding agency.'
OMB Circulars generally contain cost and administrative
requirements.3  OMB Circular A-110, titled "Uniform
Administrative Requirements for Grants and Cooperative
Agreements with Institutions of Higher Education,
29. The OMB coordinates programs "within and among Federal
departments and agencies," including the administration of procurement
policies, regulations, and procedures. UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT MANUAL
100 (1999-2000).
30. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(f) (West 1996 & Supp. 1999) (defining agency as
"includ[ing] any executive department, military department, Government
corporation, Government controlled corporation, or other establishment in
the executive branch of the Government... or any independent regulatory
agency").
31. DEMBLING & MASON, supra note 23, § 13.02 (describing the statute
that gives rise to OMB interpretive guidelines); see also 31 U.S.C.A. § 6307
(West Supp. 1983).
32. DEMBLING & MASON, supra note 23, § 9.08(a) (describing how some
grant conditions may be implicitly incorporated into a grant where the
grantee is certain to be aware that circulars dictate grant conditions).
33. Id. § 12.02 (explaining that grant conditions can come from OMB
Circulars, policy manuals, and published rules; the grant award letter may
specify the priority of the documents to abide by in case there is a conflict
among them).
34. Id. § 11.09 (mentioning that assuring compliance with grant
conditions may or may not involve the signature of the grantee promising
compliance).
35. Id. § 11.06 (noting that OMB Circulars set out uniform rules for
agencies to follow as a way to standardize agency and grantee procedures
with respect to grant awards).
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Hospitals, and Other Nonprofit Organizations," is the
circular impacted by Shelby's amendment that now
requires disclosure under the FOIA.36
B. The Freedom of Information Act
1. The Goals of the Act
The FOIA, enacted in 1966, allows ordinary American
citizens access to agency records of the federal
government's executive branch.37 The drafters of the FOIA
recognized society's strong interest in open government38
and the tension inherent in making disclosure its main
objective. 39 This tension manifests itself in issues such as
privacy and confidentiality, and has increased as
information has become available at the desktop through
the technology of the Information Age.
2. Summary of the Act
The FOIA allows individuals and groups to request
agency records without a reason or justification for their
request.40 Any individual or group making an appropriate
36. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994); The FOIA created a "statutory right of access
to government information." U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, FREEDOM OF
INFORMATION AcT GUIDE & PRIVACY AcT OVERVIEW 3 (1997) [hereinafter FOIA
GUIDE].
37. Pat Shockley, The Availability of "Trade Secret" Protection for
University Research, 20 J.C. & U.L. 309, 322 (1994) (explaining that "[tihe
policy supporting the FOIA is that a democratic society requires an
informed, intelligent electorate"); FOIA GUIDE, supra note 36, at 3 (noting
that access to government information allows accountability and better
government).
38. FOIA GUIDE, supra note 36, at 3 (explaining that "open government
can conflict with other important interests of the general public, such as
the public's interest in ... the preservation of the confidentiality of sensitive
personal, commercial, and governmental information").
39. See id. at 3, 4 (noting that "[fit is this task of accommodating
countervailing concerns, with disclosure as the predominant objective, that
the FOIA seeks to accomplish").
40. FOIA GUIDE, supra note 36, at 26 (citing Forsham v. Califano, 587
F.2d 1128, 1134 (D.C. Cir. 1978) for the proposition "that while factors
such as need, interest, or public interest may bear on agency's
determination of order of processing, they have no bearing on individuals'
FOIA request, excluding federal agencies, is entitled to
agency records.4' An appropriate request must reasonably
describe the records sought, so that agency employees are
able to gather the data, expending a reasonable amount of
effort.42
Agency-specific guidelines for FOIA requests must be
followed in addition to the statutory requirements of the
FOIA. 43 The FOIA requires that an agency provide notice,
within ten days, of whether the agency is granting or
denying a request for access to agency records." The
agency has the right to extend the processing time for an
additional ten days or longer upon written notice.45 The
requester may seek administrative or judicial review if an
agency denies access to data or fails to meet the statutory
time requirements. 46  An agency denial must include
reasons for the denial as well as information about the
requester's right to appeal.4 7 One common reason for
denial of a FOIA request is that agencies are not required
to create records in order to complete a FOIA request.'
rights of access under FOIA').
41. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a) (West 1996 & Supp. 1999); FOIA GUIDE, supra
note 36, at 25 (listing "foreign citizen[s], partnerships, corporations,
associations, and foreign or domestic governments" as well as state
agencies, as eligible to make a FOIA request, whereas federal agencies are
ineligible because they are specifically excluded from the definition of
"person" in the statute); PAUL M. SCHWARTZ & JOEL R. REIDENBERG, DATA
PRIVACY LAw 112 (1996) (contrasting the FOIA with the Privacy Act of 1974,
5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a) (West 1996 & Supp. 1999), which governs the
processing of personal information by agencies).
42. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(3)(A) (West 1996 & Supp. 1999).
43. Id. § 552(a)(3)(B), (a)(4)(A), (a)(6)(A); FOIA GUIDE, supra note 36, at
23 (explaining that each agency is required to publish its regulations for
gaining access to its records under FOIA).
44. Id. § 552(a)(6)(A)(i).
45. Id. § 552(a)(6)(B).
46. Id. § 552(a)(6)(C).
47. Id. § 552(a)(6)(A)(i).
48. 45 C.F.R. § 612.5 (1998) (quoting the National Science
Foundation's policy on record creation stating that: "A record will not be
created by compiling selected items from other documents at the request of
a member of the public nor will a record be created by analysis,
computation or other processing specifically for the requesting party. If
such analysis or computation is available in the form of a record, copies
shall be made available as provided in this regulation."); NLRB v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 161-62 (1975) (holding that the FOIA
Data WarsSpring 2001
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There is no damage remedy available to FOIA requesters
who have been denied access to agency records.49
In general, all "agency records" are subject to the FOIA. 50
In order to differentiate agency records from other types of
agency documents not subject to the FOIA, a two prong
test has been outlined by the Supreme Court: "'Agency
records' are documents which are (1) either created or
obtained by an agency, and (2) under agency control at the
time of the FOIA request.""l There are, however, exceptions
to the general rule of full disclosure of agency records
under the FOIA."2 The exemptions relevant here include, in
broad terms, exemptions for information required to be
withheld by statute3  and personal information in
personnel or medical files.'
Personal information in personnel, medical, or similar
files is exempt when disclosure would be an invasion of
personal privacy.5 Because records may not, on their face,
appear to be personal in nature, the "similar files"
exemption was created. 6 It has been defined broadly as
any information that "applies to a particular individual.""7
imposes no duty to create records).
49. FOIA GUIDE, supra note 36, at 51.
50. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(6)(A)(i) (West 1996 & Supp. 1999).
51. FOIA GUIDE, supra note 36, at 21.
52. The exemptions are non-disclosure of (1) information that would
threaten national security or foreign policy, (2) information concerning
internal personnel rules and practices of the agency, (3) information
withheld by statute, (4) trade secrets or personal financial information that
is privileged or confidential, (5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums
or letters not available in the civil discovery context for litigation involving
the agency, (6) information about people in "personnel and medical files and
similar files... [that] would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy," (7) data compiled for law enforcement purposes that
would interfere with trial fairness, law enforcement proceedings, or
"constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy," (8) information
relating to the operation or regulation of financial institutions, and (9)
geological and/or geophysical data regarding wells. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b)
(West 1996 & Supp. 1999).
53. Id. § 552(b)(3).
54. Id. § 552(b)(6).
55. FOIA GUIDE, supra note 36, at 234.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 235 (citing United States Dep't. of State v. Washington Post
Co., 456 U.S. 595 (1982)).
In 1980, a Supreme Court case limited FOIA disclosure of
data produced by federal grantees.58 The amendment to
OMB Circular A- 110 had the impact of superseding this
holding.
C. Forsham v. Harris
1. Facts of the Case
The University Group Diabetes Program (UGDP), a group
comprised of private physicians and scientists, conducted a
long-term study of various diabetes treatment regimens.6"
In the process, the study created more than 55 million
records documenting the treatment of one thousand
diabetic patients over a five to eight year period.61  The
initial results of the study showed that two drug regimens
were associated with a higher risk of death by
cardiovascular disease compared with the other drug
regimens studied.62  In response, the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) issued a statement that these two
drugs should be used in limited circumstances and it
proposed labeling changes to warn patients.63 Meanwhile,
a professional debate over the validity of the findings
ensued.'
The most vocal critic of the study was the Committee on
the Care of the Diabetic (CCD), a national association of
physicians, who asked UGDP for the raw data to review the
58. See Forsham v. Harris, 445 U.S. 169 (1980).
59. See generally, FOIA GUIDE, supra note 36 (providing the materials
each agency must make available to the public).
60. Forsham, 445 U.S. at 172 (explaining that the UGDP study was
funded by fifteen million dollars in federal grant money between 1961 and
1978).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 174 (pointing out that the two scrutinized drugs were
tolbutamide and phenformin hydrochloride).
63. Id. (discussing labeling changes for tolbutamide and phenformin
hydrochloride to require a "warning that oral hypoglycemics should be used
only in cases of adult-onset, stable diabetes that could not be treated
adequately by a combination of diet and insulin").
64. Id.
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findings. 5 UGDP did not release the data. Instead, the
granting agency, the National Institute of Arthritis,
Metabolism, and Digestive Diseases (NIAMDD),s6 contracted
with the Biometric Society," an independent association of
researchers, to validate the study; the findings showed that
the "results were mixed, but moderately strong."'
2. Lower Courts' Decisions
After exhausting all of their administrative remedies
through the agency,69 including a series of FOIA requests
and subsequent denials, CCD brought suit to compel the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) to
make the raw data available. 70 The district court granted
summary judgment in favor of the defendants using the
rationale that the raw data consisted of patient records
which did not fall within the FOIA's definition of agency
records.7 The court of appeals affirmed for the same
reason, and also found "that although NIAMDD is a federal
agency, its grantees are not federal agencies, and,
therefore, not subject to the FOIA."7 2
65. Id. at 169.
66. In terms of agency hierarchy, NIAMDD fell within the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW). The HEW was redesignated as the
Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) pursuant to the
Department of Education Organization Act of 1979. UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT MANUAL 294 (1980-1981).
67. Forsham, 445 U.S. at 173 (describing the Biometric Society as a
private grantee). The Biometric Society, now known as the International
Biometric Society, is comprised of researchers interested in developing and
applying effective statistical techniques to research data. 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
ASSOCIATIONS 775 (Tara E. Sheets ed., 33d ed. 1997).
68. Forsham, 445 U.S. at 173-74.
69. Id. at 175 (noting that an administrative law judge (AUJ) found,
through access to the raw data, that phenformin was not safe and ordered
it to be withdrawn from the market).
70. Id. at 176.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 173-76; see also Shockley, supra note 37, at 328 (comparing
the federal FOIA, where public universities are not considered agencies for
federal purposes, with state freedom of information laws, where public
universities may be considered agencies).
3. The Supreme Court Decision
The Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the lower
courts:73 "[With due regard for the policies and language of
the FOIA, we conclude that data generated by a privately
controlled organization which has received grant funds
from an agency ... but which data has not ... been
obtained by the agency, are not 'agency records' accessible
under the FOIA."74  The opinion noted that Congress
intentionally excluded private grantees from the definition
of "agency" in order to maintain grantee autonomy.7" The
legislative history of the FOIA shows that the drafters
intended to "keep federal grantees free from the direct
obligations imposed by the FOIA."76
Further, the Court recognized that acquiring data for the
direct benefit of the federal government took on
characteristics of a procurement contract, or a contract for
specific services, not a grant.77 The Court pointed out that
"Congress expressly requires an agency to use
'procurement contracts' when the principal purpose of the
instrument is the acquisition... of property or services for
the direct benefit of the Federal Government...,7 The
73. Forshamrn, 445 U.S. at 187.
74. Id. at 178, 184 (Although the FOIA does not define "agency record,"
a definition used during FOIA Senate hearings described it as "includ[ing]
all papers which an agency preserves in the performance of its functions.").
75. Id. at 179-80 (stating that "Congress could have provided that the
records generated by a federally funded grantee were federal property...
[blut Congress has not done so").
76. Id. at 182.
77. RALPH C. NASH, JR. et al., THE GOVERNMENT CONTRACTs REFERENCE
BOOK: A COMPREHENSIvE GUIDE TO THE LANGUAGE OF PROCUREMENT 409 (2d. ed.
1998) (defining a procurement contract as "a contract between the
Government and a private party to provide supplies or services"); Compare
31 U.S.C.A. § 6303 (West Supp. 1983) (describing the principal purpose of
procurement contracts as the "[acquisition ofl ... property or services for
the direct benefit or use of the United States Government"), with 31
U.S.C.A. § 6304 (West Supp. 1983) (describing the principal purpose of a
grant agreement as "[transferring] a thing of value to the... recipient to
carry out a public purpose of support or stimulation authorized by a
law... instead of acquiring ... property or services for the direct benefit or
use of the United States Government").
78. Forsham, 445 U.S. at 180 (citing the Federal Grant and Cooperative
Agreement Act of 1977, 41 U.S.C. § 503 (1976 ed., Supp. II)).
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consequences of eliminating the distinction between these
two types of government grants changes the relationship
between grantor and grantee to a contractual one,
threatening the future of government funded independent
research.
Another point highlighted by the Court was the fact that
HEW never physically obtained the records. Forsham
clarified the awarding agencies' rights with respect to data
disclosure: HEW was welcome to exercise its right to obtain
the records and turn them over, but was not compelled to
do so" because the FOIA does not require an agency to
obtain records to complete a disclosure request.8 0
4. Superseding the Forsham Holding
a. The Language of OMB Circular A-1 10 Prior to P.L. 105-
27781
OMB Circular A- 110_.36(c) 2 formerly allowed awarding
agencies the option of obtaining, reproducing, publishing
or using the data produced by its award to a grantee. If an
outsider wanted to review such data, the agency had the
discretion to compel such disclosure. The passage of P.L.
105-277 into law triggered Shelby's amendment to OMB
79. Id. at 181-82 (stating that HEW regulations do retain a right to
acquire the documents... and until that right is exercised, the records are
only the "records of grantees").
80. Id. at 186 (showing that both the HEW regulations and the
Congressional intent of the FOIA consider an agency record to be a record
physically in the possession of an agency); See FOIA GUIDE, supra note 36,
at 49.
81. Norwood J. Jackson, Memorandum for the Record, Recompilation of
OMB Circular A-I 10 (revised November 19, 1993 and published at 58 Fed.
Reg. 62992 (1993), amended by 62 Fed. Reg. 45,934 on (1997)), available at
http: //www.whitehouse.gov/OMB/circulars/a 110/al 10.html (outlining
OMB circular A-1 10_.36(c), relating to Intangible Property, in its pre-
Shelby amendment form for purposes of comparison with later amendments
to it: "Unless waived by the Federal awarding agency, the Federal
Government has the right to... (1) [o]btain, reproduce, publish or
otherwise use the data first produced under an award... [and] (2)
[a]uthorize others to receive, reproduce, publish, or otherwise use such data
for Federal purposes.").
82. Id.
Circular A- 110 which eliminated agency discretion
concerning disclosure. Awarding agencies now must
compel grantee disclosure.
b. The Language of P.L. 105-277'
Senator Shelby's amendment required:
... That the Director of OMB amends Section
.36 of OMB Circular A-110 to require
Federal awarding agencies to ensure that all
data produced under an award will be made
available to the public through the procedures
established under the Freedom of Information
Act: Provided further, That if the agency
obtaining the data does so solely at the
request of a private party, the agency may
authorize a reasonable user fee equaling the
incremental cost of obtaining the data... "4
c. OMB Circular Revision One and Two
The first proposed amendment to OMB Circular A-
110 .36(c) provided a broad license for disclosure of
research data and, as a result, over nine thousand
comments from interested parties flowed forth expressing
concern about the impact of such broad disclosure.8" The
83. Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental
Appropriations Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681, 2681-495
(1998).
84. Id.
85. Proposed Revision, OMB Circular A-110, "Uniform Administrative
Requirements for Grants and Agreements with Institutions of Higher
Education, Hospitals, and Other Non-Profit Organizations" (issued Jan. 26,
1999), available at http: / /www2.whitehouse.gov/OMB/fedreg/a- 11 Orev.
html (stating that: The Federal Government has the right to (1) obtain,
reproduce, publish or otherwise use the data first produced under an
award, and (2) authorize others to receive, reproduce, publish, or otherwise
use such data for Federal purposes. In addition, in response to a Freedom
of Information Act (FOIA) request for data relating to published research
findings produced under an award that were used by the Federal
Government in developing policy or rules, the Federal awarding agency
shall, within a reasonable time, obtain the requested data so that they can
be made available to the public through the procedures established under
the FOIA. If the Federal awarding agency obtains the data solely in response
to a FOIA request, the agency may charge the requester a reasonable fee
Data Wars 117Spring 2001
118 Journal of National Association of Administrative Law Judges 21-1
second proposed revision came in response to comments
submitted by interested parties.86 Both waves of comments
equaling the full incremental cost of obtaining the data. This fee should
reflect costs incurred by the agency, the recipient, and applicable sub-
recipients. This fee is in addition to any fees the agency may assess under
the FOIA (5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A))).
86. Request for Comments on Clarifying Changes to Proposed Revision on
Public Access to Research Data, OMB Circular A-110, "Uniform
Administrative Requirements for Grants and Agreements with Institutions of
Higher Education, Hospitals, and Other Non-Profit Organizations" (issued
Aug. 5, 1999), available at http://www2.whitehouse.gov/OMB/fedreg/
2ndnotice-a 110.html (stating that:
(c) The Federal Government has the right to (1) obtain, reproduce,
publish or otherwise use the data first produced under an award,
and (2) authorize others to receive, reproduce, publish, or
otherwise use such data for Federal purposes.
(d)(1) In addition, in response to a Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA) request for data relating to published research findings
produced under an award that were used by the Federal
Government in developing a regulation, the Federal awarding
agency shall request, and the recipient shall provide, within a
reasonable time, the research data so that they can be made
available to the public through the procedures established under
the FOIA. If the Federal awarding agency obtains the data solely in
response to a FOIA request, the agency may charge the requester a
reasonable fee equaling the full incremental cost of obtaining the
research data. This fee should reflect costs incurred by the agency,
the recipient, and the applicable sub-recipients. This fee is in
addition to any fees the agency assess under the FOIA (5 U.S.C. §
552(a) (4) (A)).
(d)(2) The following definitions are to be used for purposes of subsection (d)
(i) "Research data" is defined as the recorded factual material
commonly accepted in the scientific community as necessary
to validate researching [sic] findings, but not any of the
following: preliminary analyses, drafts of scientific papers,
plans for future research, peer reviews, or communications
with colleagues ... trade secrets, commercial information,
materials necessary to be held confidential by a researcher
until publication of their results in a peer-reviewed journal...
[or] files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, such as
information that could be used to identify a particular person
in a research study.
(ii) "Published" is defined as either when (A) research findings
are published in a peer-reviewed scientific or technical
journal, or (B) a Federal agency publicly and officially cites to
the research findings in support of a regulation.
(iii) "Used by the Federal Government in developing a regulation" is defined
as when an agency publicly and officially cites to the research findings in
support of a regulation (for which notice and comment is required under 5
U.S.C. § 553)).
raised general concerns about the impact of the
amendment on scientific research, the privacy of research
subjects, the proprietary interests of researchers, and the
ability of researchers to follow through with a research plan
without interruption caused by the release of data collected
prior to analysis and publication. 7 The comments also
called for clarifications or definitions of "data," "published,"
and "used by the Federal Government in developing policy
or rules."88 These definitions are crucial to delineating
exactly what type of data has to be released, and at what
point in the research process it must be disclosed.
These clarifications were addressed in the final revision 9
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Final Revision to OMB Circular A-110, "Uniform Administrative
Requirements for Grants and Agreements with Institutions of Higher
Education, Hospitals, and Other Non-Profit Organizations" (issued Nov. 6,
1999), available at http://www2.whitehouse.gov/OMB/fedreg/a 110-
finalnotice.html [hereinafter OMB Circular A- 110] (stating that:
As directed by OMB's appropriation for FY 1999, contained in
Public Law 105-277, OMB hereby amends Section .36 of OMB
Circular A- 110 by revising paragraph (c), redesignating paragraph
(d) as paragraph (e), and adding a new paragraph (d), to read as
follows: .36 Intangible Property
(c) The Federal Government has the right to:
(1) obtain, reproduce, publish or otherwise use the data first
produced under an award; and
(2) authorize others to receive, reproduce, publish, or
otherwise use such data for Federal purposes.
(d) (1) In addition, in response to a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)
request for research data relating to published research findings produced
under an award that were used by the Federal Government in developing an
agency action that has the force and effect of law, the Federal awarding
agency shall request, and the recipient shall provide, within a reasonable
time, the research data so that they can be made available to the public
through the procedures established under the FOIA. If the Federal awarding
agency obtains the research data solely in response to a FOIA request, the
agency may charge the requester a reasonable fee equaling the full
incremental cost of obtaining the research data. This fee should reflect
costs incurred by the agency, the recipient, and applicable sub-recipients.
This fee is in addition to any fees the agency may assess under the FOIA (5
U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)).
(d)(2) The following definitions apply for purposes of paragraph (d) of this
section:
(i) "Research data" is defined as the recorded factual material
commonly accepted in the scientific community as necessary to
validate research findings, but not any of the following:
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to OMB Circular A-110, although the final revision
presents a host of other problems discussed in Sections III-
IV infra.
III. THE RESEARCH LOOPHOLE AND OTHER IMPLICATIONS
A. The Research Loophole
The pendulum has swung from one extreme, no
disclosure, to the other extreme, full disclosure, without
anticipating the implications of the revision to OMB
Circular A-i 10. During both Forsham and more recently in
the Harvard Six Cities Study, researchers faced opposition
by corporations and industries who feared substantial
economic loss as a result of policies initiated from research
findings.9 ° Forsham and the Harvard Six Cities Study are
preliminary analyses, drafts of scientific papers, plans for future
research, peer reviews, or communications with colleagues. This
.recorded" material excludes physical objects (e.g., laboratory
samples). Research data also do not include:
(A) Trade secrets, commercial information, materials
necessary to be held confidential by a researcher until they
are published, or similar information which is protected under
law; and
(B) Personnel and medical information and similar information
the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, such as
information that could be used to identify a particular person
in a research study.
(ii) "Published" is defined as either when:
(A) Research findings are published in a peer-reviewed
scientific or technical journal; or
(B) A Federal agency publicly and officially cites the research
findings in support of an agency action that has the force and
effect of law.
(iii) "Used by the Federal Government in developing an agency
action that has the force and effect of law" is defined as when an
agency publicly and officially cites the research findings in support
of an agency action that has the force and effect of law.)
90. See supra notes 1-9, 57-73 and accompanying text (outlining the
facts of the Harvard Six Cities Study controversy and the factors leading to
the Forsham litigation). Another related controversy, surrounding tobacco
advertising, ensued when the results of a study were published in 1991 by
Paul M. Fisher in the JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOcIATION. The
findings showed that children were attracted to R.J. Reynolds' (RJR)
character Joe Camel, in which it was determined that more than half of the
examples of professional debates that embrace the spirit of
open government." However, the changes brought on by
the new OMB policy leave researchers vulnerable in ways
that are contrary to this spirit. The broad definition of
"agency action" results in disclosure of preliminary
research that becomes subject to the FOIA and threatened
by the forces of interested parties.
The pertinent portion of the OMB Circular A- I 10 revision
states:
[Iln response to a Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA) request for research data relating to
published research findings produced under
an award that were used by the Federal
Government in developing an agency action
that has the force and effect of law, the
Federal awarding agency shall request, and
the recipient shall provide, within a
reasonable time, the research data so that
they can be made available to the public
through the procedures established under the
FOIA.
92
This amendment is misleading for a number of reasons.
First, the requirement that research data be "published"
before being subjected to the FOIA appears to prevent
disclosure of preliminary research. "Published," as defined
children participating in the study recognized Joe Camel and associated the
character with cigarettes. These findings implicated the company in its
efforts to attract young tobacco purchasers. The article points out that
children are, according to market researchers, "consumers in training" and
brand awareness acquired during childhood dictates product preferences
made throughout life. RJR responded by contracting analysts to replicate
the study. The research data supporting the study was subpoenaed and
released by the Medical College of Georgia despite the protestations of
Fischer. Although Fischer's findings were criticized by tobacco industry
consultants at the time of the controversy, his research has been verified by
other researchers including RJR. RJR has since admitted that the
company's advertising targeted children. See Thurston, supra note 1, at
342-43: Paul M. Fischer, Brand Logo Recognition by Children Aged 3 to 6
Years: Mickey Mouse and Old Joe the Camel, 266 JAMA 3145 (1991); Paul
M. Fischer, Recognition of Cigarette Advertisement Product Logos, 277 JAMA
532 (1997).
91. See supra notes 36-57 and accompanying text (describing the
purpose of the FOIA).
92. OMB Circular A- 110, supra notes 83-90.
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by the amendment, means "[rjesearch findings [that] are
published in a peer-reviewed scientific or technical journal;
or [when a] Federal agency publicly and officially cites the
research findings in support of an agency action that has the
force and effect of law."93 The amendment's definition of
"publish" includes the traditional notions of publishing for
the purpose of circulation, but also includes instances
where preliminary findings show cause for governmental
concern. Publication in peer-reviewed journals connotes
complete, polished work. On the other hand, the point at
which an agency publicly and officially cites to research
findings may be at a point where preliminary findings are
all that is available. Preliminary findings are often an
indication of outcomes while not necessarily being
conclusive. For example, when dealing with health and
safety issues, the government may be justified in taking
temporary precautions based on preliminary findings until
more research is thoroughly completed. At the same time,
precautionary measures should not necessarily mean that
disclosure is imperative.
Second, the amendment fails to define "agency action."94
Due to the fact that almost all grant related research is
policy oriented in one way or another, most of this data will
be "officially cited" in the creation of government policy
through an "agency action" and will, therefore, be subject
to disclosure under the FOIA.95 An official citation to
research findings may seem, on its face, a rational time for
disclosure. However, OMB Circular A- 110's failure to
include a definition of "agency action" compels deference to
the definition in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).
Under this definition, an "agency action" includes a partial
"rule, order license, sanction, relief or the equivalent or
93. Id. (emphasis added).
94. See 5 U.S.C.A. § 551(13) (West 1996 & Supp. 1999) (defining agency
action to "include... the whole or a part of an agency rule, order, license,
sanction, relief, or the equivalent or denial thereof, or failure to act").
95. OMB Circular A- 110, supra note 89 (outlining the final revision to
OMB Circular A-I 10).
96. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.A. § 551 (West 1996 &
Supp. 1999).
denial thereof, or failure to act."
97
Unfortunately, the APA's definition of "agency action" is
too broad for application in a research setting.9" For
example, the court in Industrial Safety Equipment Ass'n v.
EPA,99 held that an agency statement setting forth a rule of
law, imposing an obligation, determining rights or
liabilities, or fixing legal relationships is an "agency
action."l°° In In re Complex Blood Bank Litigation,1 ' the
court held that a decision by the Department of Health and
Human Services not to make an employee available for a
deposition by private parties, was also an agency action for
purposes of the APA.'02 In Cableamerica Corp. v. FTC, 103 the
court held that the FTC's request for more information
from Cableamerica about a merger, pursuant to the Hart-
Scott-Rodino Act, was an "agency action" under the APA.I°4
Clearly, the APA's definition of "agency action" is too
inclusive for the fair administration of justice under OMB
Circular A-110. An agency l°' that officially cites data
produced under a grant in developing an "agency action"
opens the door for disclosure of the data through the
FOIA.' 6  This means, for example, that controversial
preliminary research officially cited in carrying out an
agency action is subject to disclosure. The government is
most likely to rely on preliminary data where there is a
potential health or safety concern. Although it is the
97. Id.; see also 2 AM. JUR. 2D Administrative Law § 468 (1994) (stating
that an agency action occurs "when an administrative agency promulgates
a rule through its usual rulemaking proceedings; issues an order pursuant
to an adjudication; grants, renews, denies, revokes, suspends, annuls,
withdraws, limits, amends, modifies, or conditions a license; grants or
denies relief; or imposes a sanction").
98. 5 U.S.C.A. § 551(13) (West 1996) (providing a definition of agency
action).
99. 656 F.Supp. 852 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
100. Id. at 855.
101. 812 F.Supp. 160 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
102. Id. at 162.
103. 795 F.Supp. 1082 (N.D. Ala. 1992).
104. Id. at 1085-86.
105. See 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(1) (West 1996 & Supp. 1999) (providing a
definition of agency).
106. See OMB Circular A- 110, supra notes 83-90.
Spring 2001 Data Wars
124 Journal of National Association of Administrative Law Judges 21-1
government's prerogative to make policy based on its own
preliminary findings in the absence of a health or safety
concern, grantees do not have the same authority; while
preliminary findings are often an indicator of outcomes,
they are not always conclusive. Any preliminary research
results that may have a negative impact on industry
groups become vulnerable to attack by industry lobbyists
who fear the economic impact of new laws or regulations.
The research in Forsham dealt with the risks of two drugs
already on the market," 7 while the research in the Harvard
Six Cities Study supported tightening regulations for
particulate matter; both of these threatened costly changes
to powerful industry groups.
It is clearly in the public's best interest to have laws and
regulations based on quality research; however, the new
policy set forth in OMB Circular A-110 may actually
promote the opposite. First, data cited in support of an
agency action may be peripheral to the regulatory change,
but still subject to FOIA disclosure. Second, researchers
will become discouraged by the possibility that an agency's
"official citation" to their findings in developing an agency
action may force the disclosure of their data prematurely.
Preliminary findings officially cited in an agency action, for
example, may be exploited to promote researcher
harassment in the form of multiple, time-consuming
requests. This is especially pertinent because the grantee
bears the entire burden of each disclosure request. 108
Research that is unpopular among commercial groups may
be subject to unnecessary FOIA requests. Since this
burden will fall on the grantee, multiple requests could
become overwhelming, proving too difficult for research
staff to handle and spoiling a researcher's yield of
publishable results. This outcome is highly probable
because studies that tracked requests since the FOIA's
inception showed that the majority of FOIA requesters were
commercial entities.10 9  Furthermore, commercial
107. Forsham v. Harris, 445 U.S. 169, 171 (1980).
108. See OMB Circular A- 110, supra notes 83-90.
109. See Shockley, supra note 37, at 329; 2 MELVIN F. JAGER, TRADE
SECRETS LAw § 12.02 (1994) (stating that "contrary to the best intentions of
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requesters' access to data is valuable to them since
different analytical methods can be employed to
manipulate findings that support industry biases.
B. Are Grantees Expected to Behave Like Government
Agencies?
Overturning Forsham means that grantees have become
an extension of the granting agency. Under Forsham, the
absence of raw data in the granting agency's possession
meant that the raw data was not an "agency record.""1 In
other words, the agency was not required to obtain data
from the grantee to comply with a FOIA request because it
was not required to create an agency record."' Due to
OMB's revision to Circular A-110, however, the grant
recipient is automatically compelled to disclose data when
an agency receives a request. This mandated compliance
means that, ipso facto, grant recipients are now an
extension of awarding agencies.
As a general rule, "the FOIA does not apply to entities
that are neither chartered by the federal government [nlor
controlled by it.""2  In Independent Investor Protective
League v. New York Stock Exch.,"3 the court held that the
New York Stock Exchange, despite being subject to heavy
government regulation, is not an agency of the federal
government." 4 Similarly, grant recipients, while heavily
regulated by the awarding agency, should be neither
considered nor treated as a government agency." 5 The
revision to OMB Circular A- 110 forces grant recipients to
Congress, the largest percentage of requests for documents under the FOIA
does not come from the press, the academic community, or researchers
seeking to ferret out mismanagement or questionable decisions... [they]
have been made by businesses").
110. See Forsham, 445 U.S. at 171.
111. Id.
112. FOIA GUIDE, supra note 36, at 18-19 (citing H.R. REP. No. 93-1380,
at 14 (1974)).
113. 367 F. Supp. 1376, 1377 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), affd, Leytman v. New
York Stock Exch., 1995 WL 761843, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 6, 1995).
114. Id.
115. See 5 U.S.C.A § 552(f) (West 1996 & Supp. 1999) (providing a
definition of agency).
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play the role of agent under the control of its awarding
agency.
Under the final revision to OMB Circular A-1 10, the
grantor's physical possession of the data is now required to
make a FOIA request. 6 Furthermore, the OMB provisions
have included a cost recovery mechanism for grantees who
are compelled to comply with the request,"7 strongly
suggesting that responding to each individual FOIA
request, previously an agency function, will become
entirely the burden of the grantee.
Contrary to the congressional intent of the FOIA, 18
grantees are now subject to the obligations of the FOIA
despite the absence of language including the grantee in
the statutory definition of an agency. As a result, the
grantee becomes more like a government controlled
establishment.
C. The Death of the Discretionary Grant?
The death of the discretionary grant is imminent as the
distinction between grants and procurement contracts
becomes murky,"9 and as the incentive for researchers to
seek grants and reap the benefits of the fruits of their labor
disappears. Grants are the means used to stimulate
projects that serve the public good. A grant does not imply
that the government is the purchaser of the grantee's
work. 2 °  However, performing research for the direct
benefit of the government, or to make research available on
demand, changes the relationship between grantor and
116. See OMB Circular A-110, supra notes 83-90.
117. See id.
118. Supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text (discussing Congress'
intent to exclude grantees from the definition of agency).
119. Representative George Brown, Letter to Congress RE: FR Doc. 99-
2220: Proposed Revision to OMB Circular A-110, "Uniform Administrative
Requirements for Grants and Agreements With Institutions of Higher
Education, Hospitals, and Other Non-Profit Organizations", at http://www.
house.gov/science-democrats/archive/gbonal 10.htm (last modified Apr. 2,
1999), (stating that the revision essentially turns all grants into
procurement contracts with Federal ownership of everything associated
with the grant).
120. Thurston, supra note 1, at 348.
grantee to a contractual one, resembling the role of a
contractee in a procurement contract. 2 ' Treating raw data
produced under a grant as a product purchased or
controlled by the government, for all practical purposes,
changes a grant into a procurement contract.'2 2 A grant
with a research agenda that is "encouraged" by the
government will reach the procurement contract-like
threshold when the data is implicated in support of public
policy perceived as threatening to industry groups.
Another contributing factor to the possible death of the
discretionary grant is the mandated disclosure of data to
third party requesters after its first public appearance.123
The raw data associated with a study is the embodiment of
years of work by the principal investigator and/or the
research team. The arduous grant application process
begins with a research idea, and culminates with its
incarnation as a grant proposal.124 Research outcomes are
generally published in peer review journals and books, and
each data set generally produces multiple publications.12
If, however, there is mandated disclosure of data after its
initial public appearance, the government may remove the
incentive for researchers to carry out research activities
that serve the public good. It is no secret that the
researchers most likely to be impacted by OMB Circular A-
110 are the class of researchers seeking tenure, staff
privileges, or some equivalent status. Disclosure of their
raw data will allow others to use the data before the yield of
their work is complete, and may jeopardize the property
interests granted by Congress and enjoyed by
researchers.'2 6  This will inhibit research that may
121. 31 U.S.C.A. § 6303 (West 1994) (describing the principal purpose
of procurement contracts as the "acqui[sition of] ... property or services for
the direct benefit or use of the United States Government").
122. Nash, supra note 77, at 409 (defining a procurement contract as "a
contract between the Government and a private party to provide supplies or
services").
123. Thurston, supra note 1, at 347.
124. Id.
125. Id. (pointing out that the Harvard Six Cities Study data set has
produced more than one hundred peer review articles).
126. Id. at 348 (citing the National Technology Transfer and Advance-
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otherwise promote answers to complex social problems
and, in turn, change public policy.
IV. CONCLUSION
Under the FOJA, access to agency records of the federal
government's executive branch allows individual citizens,
organizations, and partisan political parties, to "check" on
those who govern.'27  FOIA, the embodiment of open
government, is a highly praised public policy. '28 Indeed,
each state has passed its own freedom of information
laws.129 This is a reflection of the value placed on open
government in a contemporary democracy. In that light,
there is no suggestion in this Comment that access to raw
data used in federally funded grant research should not be
available for investigation or that it should go without
validation. The philosophy behind the FOIA, providing
American citizens the opportunity to inform themselves
about the public behavior of those who govern, reflects
revered ideals.
What is at stake here, as outlined in parts III(A)-(C)
supra, are warnings that were not heeded and outcomes
that were not foreseen. Research data is now subject to
the overreaching scope of the OMB Circular Amendment,
grant recipients must behave like an extension of the
federal awarding agency, and grant recipients bear the
administrative burden of disclosure. It is my contention
that, in the absence of changes to this OMB policy, the
discretionary grant will become extinct as it becomes
fraught with difficult burdens and diminishing rewards.
One remedy for problems associated with the OMB
Circular Amendments, is the formation of an
administrative board to appoint a revolving committee
comprised of researchers, OMB staff, representatives of
ment Act of 1995 as an example of the government support for extending
ownership and licensing rights for intellectual property produced with
federal support).
127. See 5 U.S.C.A. § 552 (West 1994).
128. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text (discussing the
drafters' theory behind the FOIA).
129. JAGER, supra note 109, § 12.01.
industry groups, and others to evaluate the issues
associated with a request for data opposed by researchers.
A disclosure denial will trigger a committee evaluation of
the researchers' concerns and the requester's interests.
The committee will balance the burden on the
researchers against the benefits of immediate or future
disclosure. The committee will have full power to grant,
deny, or postpone access to the data. Postponement is a
remedy that will allow researchers more time to publish
findings or realize any other property interests associated
with the data. But, each decision will be made in the
absence of haste with informed decision-makers
representing interests from all groups. This will ensure that
decisions are made for the sake of research validation, not
research harassment.
Another solution is to clearly define what agency actions
trigger FOIA disclosure pursuant to OMB Circular A- 110.
As it stands now, for example, data can be cited in support
of an agency action even though that data may actually be
peripheral to the agency action. The mere mention of the
data, however, can result in disclosure.
Finally, OMB should encourage researchers to share
data. This is achievable in a variety of ways, but one model
is through the preparation of public use data.13 ° Public use
data is either a subset of a larger data set or an entire data
set with redacted information. In the case of human
subject research this is especially important; protecting
personal information to avoid deductive disclosure is a high
priority.
1 3 1
A successful model of data sharing is the Inter-University
Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR), an
130. National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health, Addhealth
Homepage, at http://www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/addhealth/datasets.html
(last modified Nov. 8, 2000) (showing, for example, that the Addhealth
public use data consists of one half of the core sample chosen at random).
131. Id. (defining deductive disclosure as: [T]he discerning of an
individual respondent's identity and responses through the use of known
characteristics of that individual... [so that] if a person is known to have
participated in ANY survey, then a combination of his or her personal
characteristics will allow an individual to determine which record
corresponds to that individual).
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archive of shared social science data that is prepared for
public use.132 A Council is elected by ICPSR's members to
oversee its administration and policies for data access. 133
Data is deposited by researchers or institutions and ICPSR
prepares the data for public use. Sharing public use data
through an archive may be one of many ways to protect
researchers and the integrity of the research process, while
also providing open access to data that impacts public
policy. These potential remedies attempt to harmonize the
interests of FOIA requesters and grantees while remaining
true to the ideal of open government and the legislative
intent of the FOIA.
132. See Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research
Homepage, at http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/INTRA/index.html (last visited
July 21, 2001), (providing a mission statement and information about the
organization as well as searchable archive of data available to member
institutions).
133. Id., at http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/ORG/about.html (last visited
July 21, 2001) (providing information about ICPSR's Council and history of
the institution).
